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Abstract
From a detailed study of the yearly wage bargaining rounds in Norway and
Sweden, we construct time series of ﬁve complemetary coordination indices.
Econometrics is used to evaluate the importance of the coordination indicators
for our understanding of the changes in the rates of unemployment in the
two countries. The results show that there is considerable similarity between
the two countries, e.g., in terms of the estimated eects of macroeconomic
variables on unemployment, The coe!cients are recursively stable over the
the 1980s and 1990s. Simulation shows that the models imply numerically
important eects of wage coordination on the rates of unemployment in both
countries.
Keywords: unemployment, wage setting, economic institutions, cor-
poratism, centralization, decentralization, income policies, econometric
modelling.
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1 Introduction
In most European countries, individual wages are aected by collective bargain-
ing between employers and employees. The institutional framework in which this
bargaining takes place vary strongly from country to country, in particular with
respect to the degree of coordination. These variations are now typically considered
to play a key role in the understanding of the European unemployment problem.
A fully centralised bargaining system may produce low unemployment because the
bargainers induced to take the aggregate (equilibrium) consequences of their be-
haviour into account, and hence avoid damaging wage-price spirals. However, a
centralised system may be less responsive towards demand- and supply forces that
call for changes in relative wages. As pointed out by Calmfors and Dri!ll (1988), the
relationship between wage coordination and unemployment may be non-monotonic.
Both extremes may produce better results than middle-of-the-road systems, as the
wage aspirations of e.g., branch-level bargainers are neither checked by the compet-
itive forces associated with completely local wage setting, nor by internalising the
aggregate outcome associated with completely centralized bargaining.
In recent years, there has been a burst of research into the relationship between
the degree of wage coordination on the one hand and the rate of unemployment
(or other macroeconomic success indicators) on the other. Based on cross-section
analyses of country-speciﬁc unemployment rates, the result that coordinated wage
bargaining systems produce lower unemployment than more decentralized systems,
seems to be fairly robust, see Calmfors and Dri!ll (1988), Soskice (1990); Bean
(1994),Jackman et al. (1996), Scarpetta (1996),OECD (1997),OECD (1999), Nickell
and Layard (1999) and Iversen (1999). But there are at least three serious problems
associated with these pieces of evidence. The ﬁrst is that they are based on compar-
isons of countries that do not only dier in terms of their wage bargaining systems,
but also in terms of other structural characteristics, as well as in their macroeconomic
policy practices. And given that the few degrees of freedom available in cross-section
studies makes it virtually impossible to condition on all potentially relevant factors,
it is a possibility that the correlation across countries between wage coordination
and unemployment is spurious. The second problem is that of measurement. The
analyses referred to above are all based on the construction of crude indices that
rank the countries in terms of wage coordination or centralization and also quan-
tify the dierences between them. It is clear that the construction of such indices
involve a large element of subjective judgement, and as demonstrated by Flanagan
(1999), apparently small changes in these judgements may drastically change the
qualitative results. The third problem is that the cross-section analyses disregard
the substantial element of variation in coordination within countries over time (al-
though some of the studies do represent each country with two or three observations
corresponding to dierent periods).
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The aim of the present paper is to take advantage of within-country variations
in wage setting coordination over time in order to identify the relationship between
wage coordination and unemployment. For this purpose, we have engaged in a de-
tailed study of the yearly wage bargaining in Norway and Sweden during the past
four decades. Qualitative information about each year’s wage settlements has then
been used to construct time series of ﬁve complementary coordination indicators
describing the level of the bargaining, the degree of government participation (in-
comes policies), the degree of coordination on the employer- and employee sides,
respectively, and the bargaining climate between the two parties. We use this com-
prehensive information, together with other structural and macroeconomic variables,
to assess the causal relationship between wage coordination or ’corporatism’ and the
rate of unemployment.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we review the intellectual foun-
dation for the type of wage-coordination endeavours that have dominated much of
Norwegian and Swedish wage setting, with the aid of a simple theoretical bargaining
model. Section 3 gives a brief historic overview of wage bargaining in Norway and
Sweden and presents the ﬁve coordination indicator series for each country. Section
4 discusses methodology and presents the results of the econometric analyses, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Theory: How does coordination aect unemployment?
Our main theoretical point can be made in the, by now, standard modelling frame-
work of Layard et al. (1991). Wages are set in a decentralized bargaining process,
while product prices are determined by monopolistically competing proﬁt maximiz-
ing ﬁrms. Wage- and price setters target a (consumer or producer) real wage, and
their respective wage claims depend on the rate of unemployment. Let i = 1, 2, ..., I
be the set of monopolistically competing ﬁrms. Output in ﬁrm i, Yi, is proportional
to labour inputs Ni, i.e., Yi = ANi . Assume that each ﬁrm faces a demand function
of the form
(1) Yi =
µ
Pi
P
¶3#
D(P,X), # > 1,
where Pi is the price set by ﬁrm i, P is the aggregate producer price level and D(.)
denotes aggregate demand withX as (vector of) demand determining variables. The
price elasticity of demand, #, depends on the degree of competition in the product
market, but is assumed to be independent of the level of aggregate demand. To
maximize proﬁts, each ﬁrm equalizes marginal revenues to unit costs. This implies
that the price set by ﬁrm i is a mark-up on the (productivity-adjusted) wage cost,
Wi , in that ﬁrm:
(2) Pi =
µ
1 +
1
#  1
¶
Wi
A
.
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The union in ﬁrm i maximizes the utility function
(3) Ui = Ni
µ
)Wi  ((1 u))W + uB)
Pc
¶
,
where ) is the fraction of the ﬁrms’ wage costs that accrues to the worker, Pc is the
consumer price level, u is the rate of unemployment, W is the wage rate prevailing
in other ﬁrms and B is the income allocated to unemployed workers (and/or the
value of leisure). The wedge between the consumer and the producer real wage
is determined by income- and payroll taxes and by import prices. We have that
) = (1  1)(1 +  2)31 and Pc = (1 +  3)I(P, V P imp), where  1 is the income tax,
 2 is the payroll tax, 3is the commodity tax and I(.) is a price index depending on
producer prices P , and import prices P imp adjusted for the exchange rate V .
The wage is determined through a generalized Nash-bargaining over wages
only, i.e., Wi = argmax
³
U
q
i 
(13q)
i
´
,where i is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm. The solution
to this maximization problem is
(4) )Wi =
1
1 c
((1 u))W + uB) ,
where
(5) c =
q
q + #  1
.
The take-home wage in each ﬁrm is a mark-up on alternative income, and the
mark-up depends on relative bargaining strengths and the degree of product market
competition. In a symmetric equilibrium we have that Pi = P and Wi = W, hence
the aggregate price- and wage setting equations reduce to
W
P
=
#  1
#
A(6)
u = )W
c
)W B
(7)
From (6), the real producer wage is determined solely by the price setting mecha-
nism, i.e., it is a fraction of the labour productivity which is larger the more ﬁerce
is the product market competition. Wage setting behaviour in turn does not aect
the equilibrium real wage at all, only the rate of unemployment, see 7.
We wish to take the argument one step further by noting that for the economy
as a whole it is unreasonable to treat the nominal level of unemployment income, B,
as given. Unemployment beneﬁts are normally (mechanically or discretionary) tied
to previous earnings. And even other sources of welfare, such as income support
from family members, social assistance, capital income and the provision of public
services are likely to be closely related to the general standard of living in the
society. This implies that in the long run, it is appropriate to assume that there is
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a ﬁxed replacement ratio, 4,attached to the nominal take-home pay, in that B =
4)W . Consequently, the wage setting curve determines the equilibrium rate of
unemployment uniquely:
(8) u =
c
1 4
Wage setters try to set wages relative to the income derived from unemployment,
but as the income derived from unemployment catches up, they are unable to do
so. Nevertheless, because they are uncoordinated, they keep on trying until the
unemployment rate obtains the value at which the desired relationship between the
wage and the income derived from unemployment exactly matches the exogenously
determined replacement ratio, 4. At this point the rate of unemployment reaches its
equilibrium level. The equilibrium rate of unemployment is higher, the higher is the
replacement ratio, the lower is the elasticity of labour demand and the higher is the
bargaining power of the workers. It is independent of the level of productivity, as
well as taxes and other wedge variables. Since the real wage is determined by price
setting behaviour in the long run, the welfare of the unions is strictly higher the
weaker is their own bargaining power. Each union of course pursues its own self-
interest. But the collective result of this uncoordinated activity is that all lose. This
conclusion forms a strong intellectual basis for collective wage restraint, and may
explain why unions in Norway and Sweden have indeed embarked on co-ordinating
activities that aim at halting the nominal wage growth for their own members. In the
present model, such a policy would simply amount to a reduction in the bargaining
power of local unions, q. However, even though collective wage moderation is a
desirable equilibrium outcome for all agents in the economy, it may be very di!cult
to accomplish in practice. Each local union has obvious incentives to defect from the
co-operative strategy, particularly if wage setting is viewed as a one-shot game. In
a dynamic setting, co-operative wage setting may be more sustainable, see Holden
and Raaum (1991). But even if the coordination problem is solved, there may be
short-term gains associated with more aggressive wage setting if the price setting
mechanism operates sluggishly.
More generally, the steady state is likely to involve productivity- and hence
real wage growth as well as inﬂation. If wages grow over time, the precise way
in which unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to wages may be of importance. In
both Norway and Sweden, there is a lag in the determination of beneﬁts, arising
from the fact that these payments are indexed to previous nominal earnings. As a
result, the replacement ratio is, in relation to expected earnings, lower the higher
is the rate of nominal wage growth. In times of low inﬂation, this may not matter
much. But during periods of very high inﬂation, the consequences may be quite
severe for the unemployed workers concerned. To illustrate a potentially interesting
consequence of this latter point, assume that there exists a steady state characterized
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by a constant yearly nominal wage growth given by gw. Assume also that the income
of the unemployed is indexed to the nominal wage level in the previous year. The
steady state wage curve can then be written
u =
c
1 4W
, where 4W =
1
1 + gw
4,
hence the replacement ratio is discounted with a rate that is equal to the nominal
wage growth. Again, there is no trade o between the rate of unemployment and
the level of the wage rate in the long run. There is, however, a trade-o between the
rate of unemployment and the rate of nominal wage growth. The conclusion that
the equilibrium rate of unemployment depends on the structural factors that aect
wage setting (bargaining power, product market competition and everything that
aects the living standard of the unemployed) continues to hold.
The main merit of our theoretical model is that it makes transparent why the
institutional aspects of wage setting play an important role for unemployment in a
steady state equilibrium situation. However, the theory makes a list of assumptions
that are unlikely to hold in practice, e.g., identical ﬁrms and one type of labour
input, ﬁxed labour supply, a particular form of unions’ utility function, and no
adjustment lags.1 Consequently, equation (8) may lead to a model with undesirable
statistical properties when estimated on time series data. On the other hand, the
possibility of a causal mechanism between wage coordination and unemployment is
not limited by the speciﬁcs underlying the derivation of (8), but is of interest also
for a wider class of models. Thus, it is important that judgement of the relevance of
wage coordination is based on a model of the rate of unemployment that has good
statistical properties. In general, this will lead to inclusion of additional explanatory
variables to those already motivated by the formal theoretical model, see section 4
below. First, however, the corporative facet of wage formation has to be made
operational. The construction of our new coordination indices is explained in the
next section.
3 Coordination indices for Norway and Sweden
Norway and Sweden have strong traditions for coordinated wage setting. In the
1960s and 1970s, the degree of coordination was high in both countries. Starting
in the 1980s, Sweden has moved towards less centralised and less coordinated wage
settlements. This trend has been strengthened in the 1990s. Norway also embarked
upon less coordinated wage settlements in the beginning of the 1980s, but in this
1For example, Kolsrud and Nymoen (1998) investigate a dynamic wage-price system that im-
plies a steady state for inﬂation, the real wage and the real exchange rate for any given level of
unemployment.However, if that model is modiﬁed so that unemployment is linked the real wage
rate, the eects of increased wage pressure will be qualitatively the same as in the static model in
this section.
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case the decentralisation was reversed during the late 1980s. The revitalisation of
coordination in Norway has continued in the 1990s. There are some traditional
dierences in bargaining patterns between Norway and Sweden that seem to have
persisted. First, there is a greater number of bargainers in Sweden. Second, govern-
ment intervention, or incomes policy, has been more actively used in Norway. The
Norwegian system has permanent institutions for income policy, whereas in Sweden
incomes policy has been used only under exceptional circumstances.
There are several dimensions of coordination in collective wage bargaining, and
it is interesting to consider the eects of each dimension separately. Our deﬁnition
of coordination hence includes a traditional indicator, the level of bargaining, as
well as less traditional indicators as incomes policies from the government, coordi-
nation between labour unions and between employers’ associations, and the overall
bargaining climate. These ﬁve coordination indicators have been constructed after
a thorough study of each year’s collective bargaining in Norway and Sweden in the
period from 1961 to 1999, as documented in Barkbu (2000) The operational deﬁ-
nitions of the indicators are therefore partly adapted to the tradition of collective
bargaining in these two countries, but it should be possible to construct similar
indicators for other countries.
The ﬁve indicators have been given values {0, 0.5, 1} according to the degree
of coordination each year, where 1 generally indicates a high level of coordination.
0 indicates a low level of coordination. The full set of indicator values is shown in
table 1.
The ﬁrst indicator, I1, reﬂects the level of bargaining. Both in Norway and
Sweden, collective bargaining has traditionally been dominated by the strongest
labour union confederation (LO) and a counterpart employers’ association (NHO in
Norway; SAF in Sweden). The agreements signed by these organisations are often
wage-leading. Prior to each bargaining round, the two organisations decide whether
bargaining will be at the peak (national) level or at the industry level, a decision
which is believed to be of great importance for the outcome of that year’s collective
bargaining round. Thus, our operational deﬁnition of level of bargaining has been
to allocate the value 1 to I1 if bargaining between LO and NHO/SAF is at the peak
or national level, and 0 if bargaining is at the industry or sector level.
The second indicator, I2, considers coordination in the form of incomes policies,
i.e., government contributions such as tax reliefs, price subsidies etc. for instance
in order to moderate wage demands or to increase employment. It is important to
note that government contributions are considered as incomes policy solely when
they are made conditional on the organisations’ actions in the collective bargaining.
I2 is given the value 1 when the government intervenes in the bargaining and is 0
when the government does not actively intervene in order to aect the results of the
bargaining.
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Table 1: Indicators of wage formation coordination and incomes policy.
Norway Sweden
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 average I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 average
1961 0 0 1 1 1 0.6 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1962 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1963 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1964 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1965 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1966 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1967 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1968 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 0.8 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1969 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1970 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 1 0.7
1971 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.6
1972 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.9 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.6
1973 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.9
1974 0 1 0.5 1 1 0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1
1975 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.8
1976 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.8
1977 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.9 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.6
1978 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.9 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1979 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.9 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
1980 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.6
1981 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.5
1982 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.2 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.5
1983 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.1
1984 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.1 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.2
1985 1 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.4 0,5 1 0 0 0.5 0.4
1986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.3
1987 1 0 1 1 1 0.8 0,5 0.5 0 0 0.5 0.3
1988 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 1 0.3
1989 1 1 1 1 1 1 0,5 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5
1990 0.5 0 1 1 1 0.7 0,5 0.5 0.5 0 1 0.5
1991 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.9 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.9
1992 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.9 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.9
1993 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
1994 0 1 1 1 1 0.8 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
1995 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.9 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.1
1996 0 1 0 1 1 0.6 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.1
1997 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0.2
1998 0 1 0 0.5 1 0.5 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
1999 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.4
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The indicators I3 and I4 reﬂect the degree of coordination among participants
on the employee- and employer side, respectively. As discussed in the theoretical
section, labour unions have a common interest in moderate wage demands, but
there are obvious reasons for each union, at least in the short run, to deviate from
moderation. Often, there have been attempts to coordinate the demands of the
dierent labour unions. The indicator I3 has been allocated the value 1 when there
have been successful coordination eorts, and 0 if there have been no eorts or
eorts have been unsuccessful. We have focused on the level of coordination within
LO and between LO and the other unions. Similarly, the indicator I4 has been given
the value 1 when the employers’ associations have not attempted to divert from the
main content of other associations’ agreements. We have focused on the level of
coordination within NHO/SAF and between NHO/SAF and the other associations.
I5 is an indicator of the overall bargaining climate. We have focused on the
climate between key labour unions and employers’ associations before and during the
collective bargaining. In addition, we have taken into consideration the number of
strikes appearing during each round. The indicator has the value 1 if the bargaining
climate was relatively favourable to an agreement , whereas it obtains the value 0 if
there were great disparities between the parties.
An alternative index of corporatism is provided by Iversen (1999, Ch 3). It
builds on the idea that the fewer is the number of participants at the crucial levels
of the bargaining processes, the easier it is to coordinate the outcomes. Let wjtbe
a weight (subjectively) assigned to level j bargaining (ﬁrm, industry or whole econ-
omy) in year t, and let pijt be the fraction of unionised workers at that level belonging
to union i. Iversen’s index is then equal to
P
j
P
iwjtp
2
ijt. This index takes a larger
value the fewer and the larger (relative to other unions) are the unions operating at
the most important levels of wage bargaining. In section 4.2 and 4.3 we investigate
the empirical relevance of both our own and Iversen’s indices in econometric models
of the rates of unemployment in the two countries.
4 The empirical relationship between wage coordination and
unemployment
In this section we investigate the role of the coordination indices in explaining the
rates of unemployment in Norway and Sweden. Section 4.1 ﬁrst discusses how
econometric methodology can help bridge the gap between our qualitative and static
theory on the one hand and the dynamic and non-stationary aspects of observed
unemployment rates on the other. Section 4.2 and 4.3 then reports our econometric
models. Finally, simulation is used to illustrate the eects of hypothetical changes
in collective bargaining set-up.
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4.1 Methodology
The rates of unemployment in the two countries are observed over a relatively short
sample period, and display heterogeneity, persistence and possibly non-stationarity
caused by “regime shifts”. In contrast, the formal theory in section 2 is static
and partial in nature, and a direct application of say, equation (8), after suitable
linearization and replacing 4 and c by the relevant data series, is unlikely to provide
useful results. A better strategy is to explicitly model the unemployment rate,
seeking econometric relationships that are congruent with the available data evidence
on the measured attributes.
Our starting point is a general and unrestricted model, denotedGUM, that has
white-noise residual properties. The ﬁnal model is chosen on the basis of a general
to speciﬁc modelling strategy, denoted Gets: see Hendry (1995, Ch 8 and 14).
Common concerns with the Gets speciﬁcation procedure include the question about
the meaning of “signiﬁcant” t-values after repeated testing; worries that chance
correlations and “over-ﬁtting” make the ﬁnal model become sample dependent or
sample speciﬁc; and the issue about “path dependency” and “investigators bias”,
meaning that only a small number of possible simpliﬁcation paths are investigated
and documented. However, recent work by Hoover and Perez (1999) and Hendry and
Krolzig (2000) have shown that Gets performs surprisingly well in controlled Monte-
Carlo situation, especially against the background of the pessimistic results in Lovell
(1983) whose work they extend: In most “states of nature” the simpliﬁed model is
either the correct speciﬁcation or comes very close to it. Also, the t-statistics of the
tested-down models are well behaved.
However, the performance of Gets also depends on the size of the GUM and
speciﬁcally on whether it includes the correct local data generating process. In our
case, the large number of coordination indices that we wish to test, the need to
include additional explanatory variables for congruency and the low (nominal) sam-
ple size T , invokes “the curse of dimensionality”: Ideally, in order to accommodate
all hypotheses, we would like a larger GUM. Thus, although we derive our results
from a congruent GUM, there may be competing GUMs that are also congruent and
this may induce an element of researcher’s bias or “GUM speciﬁcity” in our ﬁnal
model. Although this problem by its very nature cannot be resolved in a single
study, we seek to reduce the problem by reporting the results of neighbouring GUM
speciﬁcations and other robustness tests.
Given that the GUM is well speciﬁed, the short sample T < 40 may be less
of a problem for the applicability of Gets than one might think. Experience from
“short-sample modelling” in e.g., Nymoen (1992) and Campos and Ericsson (1999),
reminds us that what matters is not the nominal sample size but what we may think
of as the information content per observation, see Campos and Ericsson (1999).
Information content may be large if the data span years with large changes in the
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individual variables and in the correlation structure between variables. In our case,
the late 1980s saw a sharp increase in unemployment in Norway. In the early
1990s an even more dramatic increases occurred in Sweden. Other major events
followed the increase in unemployment: A large devaluation (Sweden), revitalization
of incomes policies (Norway), and late in the sample an increased role of monetary
policy stabilizing inﬂation.
Our modelling strategy is summarized in three steps:
1. For each country, a single equation model is ﬁrst presented, in terms of a GUM
and a ﬁnal model is chosen from Gets modelling.
2. The model resulting from step 1, includes explanatory variables that are po-
tentially endogenous (i.e., reacting to the rate of unemployment, contempora-
neously or lagged), and that may be themselves be explainable with the aid of
our coordination indices. Therefore, a system of equations model is estimated
by Fiml and its properties investigated.
3. Based on the model in step 2, the numerical importance of the eects of the
coordination indices is illustrated by simulation (intervention analysis).
4.2 Norway
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total rate of unemployment,
tut, deﬁned as the sum of registered unemployed and labour programmes participants
divided by the size of the labour force. We have considered to instead model the
rate of “open” employment, i.e., without workers on labour market programmes, or
a standardized (Labour Force survey) deﬁnition of the unemployment rate. Impor-
tantly, the substantial ﬁndings below are not dependent on the choice of deﬁnitions,
but (for both countries) we prefer to present the econometric relationships that were
achieved for the total rate of unemployment. The use of the logarithmic transform
likewise aids congruent modelling.
In addition to the corporative indices we include the following explanatory
variables:
1. The log of the replacement ratio, rprt.
2. The rate of GDP growth, {yt.
3. The log the wage-share in the manufacturing sector, wsht, as a measure of
proﬁtability in that sector of the economy.
4. The log of the labour market programme rate, prot.
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The role of the replacement ratio was motivated theoretically in section 2. The other
variables generalizes the model to include the other explanatory factors discussed at
the end of section 2. Speciﬁcally, Rødseth (1997) and Lindbeck (1997) have empha-
sised the importance of aggregate demand and exchange rate policy in keeping down
unemployment in Norway and Sweden, see also Calmfors and Nymoen (1990) and
Rødseth and Nymoen (1999). The two ﬁrst terms ({yt) and (wsht) accommodate
this view. The rationale for the third term is that labour market programmes have
been used actively to counter swings in employment and to combat skill deteriora-
tion and discouraged worker eects. The eect of these programmes at the level of
individual workers remain in dispute, see e.g., Dølvik et al. (1997), but they are an
integral part of the determination of the measured rate of unemployment in Norway
as well as in Sweden. Finally, we include the lagged rate of unemployment in order
to capture the evident adjustment lags. Similar sets of explanatory variables are
also used in existing econometric models on quarterly data, see e.g., Bårdsen et al.
(1999).
Estimation showed that the replacement ratio failed to assert itself empiri-
cally.2 Part of the reason is that in the sample the replacement ratio is driven by
variation in the inﬂation rate and is correlated with the wage-share variable. Instead
of throwing out the wage-share we kept that variable since it represents a channel
that coordination indices may aect unemployment. Moreover, since Holden and
Nymoen (2001) and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999) ﬁnd signiﬁcant eects of the re-
placement rate in a model of manufacturing wages, it is possible that the ﬁnal system
of equations, where the wage-share is endogenous, will be more suited to represent
the eects of the replacement rate on the unemployment rate.
Thus, table 2 shows the results of a general model where only four economic
explanatory variables are included (GDP growth, the wage-share, programmes and
lagged unemployment). Because of this parsimony in the “economic” part of the
equation, there are enough degrees of freedom to estimate freely the coe!cient of
all the coordination indices with one lag each.
The bottom part of the table contains statistics that can be used to evaluate
whether this general unrestricted model is congruent with the data: The multiple
correlation coe!cient (R2), the residual standard error (jˆ), the Durbin-Watson sta-
tistic (DW ), the Fdistributed tests of residual autocorrelation (FAR), autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (FARCH). Finally, we include the Doornik and Hansen
(1994) Chi-square test of residual non-normality (2N), see Doornik and Hendry
(1999). The numbers in brackets are p-values for the respective null hypotheses,
e.g., of no residual 2. order autocorrelation in the case of FAR(2, 16),–they show
2 A test of the hypothesis that the omission of rprt and rprt1from table 2 gives F (2, 18) =
0.95932[0.4019]: The result does not depend on whether the log-transform (i.e., rprt) is used or
not.
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Table 2: Norway: Modelling {tut from 1963 to 1998. (OLS estimation results
of a general model)
Variable Coe!cient Standard Error t-probability
Constant 5.1597 3.6452 0.1723
tut31 -0.32532 0.10545 0.0058
{yt -5.8475 1.4800 0.0008
wsht31 0.81767 0.57023 0.1670
{prot 0.53405 0.06800 0.0000
prot31 0.22183 0.10652 0.0503
I1t -0.064850 0.064973 0.3301
I1t31 -0.14090 0.064295 0.0404
I2t -0.019158 0.060659 0.7554
I2t31 -0.037660 0.044807 0.4106
I3t -0.047620 0.080262 0.5596
I3t31 -0.025782 0.081161 0.7540
I4t 0.16788 0.15857 0.3024
I4t31 0.35464 0.27058 0.2048
I5 0.090701 0.14272 0.5323
I5t31 -0.23347 0.23883 0.3400
R2 = 0.922 jˆ = 0.090 DW = 2.1
for 16 variables and 36 observations.
FAR(2, 18) = 1.1177[0.3487],
FARCH(1, 18) = 2.898[0.1059]
2N(2) = 0.54848[0.7601]
that none of the diagnostic tests are signiﬁcant.
Turning to the coe!cient estimates, note that almost every variable in the
economic part of the equation is signiﬁcant, the least signiﬁcant variable is the lagged
wage-share, with a signiﬁcance level of 0.17. Among the coordination indices, only
I1 t31 is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the majority of the variables have very high
signiﬁcance levels. Thus, an F -test on the omission of all 10 indicator variables gives
F (10, 20) = 1.09[0.42], so the lack of signiﬁcance of the majority of the indicator
variables is not due to multicollinearity as such. Omission of all indicator variables
other than I1t and I1t31 yielded F (6, 22) = 0.41[0.86], so it seemed reasonable to
keep only those two indicator variables. The lagged wage-share variable now became
signiﬁcant, and it was also convenient to restrict the coe!cient of prot to be twice
that of prot31 (already evident in table 2) resulting in a single term {prot + prot.
Lastly, and perhaps exposing ourselves to the danger of “overﬁtting”, we joined
up I1t (t-value 1.01) together with its signiﬁcant lag (2.7), in the form of the
variable I1t + 2 · I1t31.
The ﬁnal equation is therefore
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Figure 1: Recursive stability of ﬁnal model of the Norwegian rate of unemployment.
{ btut = 6.94
(2.1878)
 0.388
(0.034)
tut31  5.457
(1.055)
{yt + 1.046
(0.349)
wsht31(9)
+ 0.292
(0.0259)
({prot + prot) 0.0594
(0.022)
(I1t + 2 · I1t31)
R2 = 0.903 jˆ = 0.082 DW = 2.23 FENC(10, 20) = 0.47[0.89]
FAR(2, 28) = 2.56[0.10] FARCH(1, 28) = 1.34[0.26]
2N(2) = 1.16[0.56] FX2(10, 19) = 1.30[0.30]
The estimated coe!cients of the economic variables have barely changed from the
general model, and their standard errors (reported below the coe!cient estimates)
have been reduced considerably.3 In all, the equation imposes 10 restrictions on the
general model in table 2. The F -test of the joint signiﬁcance of the restriction is
reported below the equation as FENC(10, 20), showing that with 10 fewer parameters,
equation (9) ﬁts the data almost as well as the model in table 2. That the other
residual statistics in equation (9) are insigniﬁcant is also evidence that the reduction
is valid.4
3Note that in table 2, the estimated coecient of prot is almost twice as large as the coe!cient
of prot1. Imposing that restriction gives the variable prot + prot1 in equation (9).
4The diagnostics to equation (9) also includes a test of heteroscedasticity due to squares of the
regressors (FX2), as implemented in PcGive 9.3.
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Figure 2: Comparison with Iversen (1999) index with the index used as regresson
in equation (9), i.e., "best predictor". Scale adjusted for readability
Figure 1 shows the stability of equation (9) over the period 1977-98. The six
ﬁrst graphs show the recursively estimated elasticities in (9), with ±2 estimated
coe!cient standard errors, denoted q and ±2j in the graphs. The last two graphs
show ﬁrst the 1-step residuals with ±2 residual standard errors, ±2j in the graph,
and ﬁnally the sequence of 1-step Chow statistics scaled with their 5% critical levels.
All graphs show a high degree of stability.
The potential omission of the replacement ratio can be addressed again using
equation (9). For the null hypothesis that both rprt and rprt31 have zero coe!-
cients the relevant statistic became F (2, 28) = 1.3178[0.2838]. The most signiﬁcant
eect obtained was for the dierenced variable {rprt, which obtained a coe!cient
of 0.43013 (with “t-value” of 1.614) when added to equation (9). The estimated
coe!cients in equation (9) were practically unaected by the inclusion of {rprt.
As already noted we will consider the possibility of indirect eect of the replace-
ment rate, when we model a system of equations that contains the wage-share as an
endogenous variable. A variable for the coverage by the main trade confederation
(LO) was always tried added to equation (9), but neither the union coverage itself
nor its dierence were statistically signiﬁcant.
As already noted, there is a danger that the inclusion of the corporative variable
in the ﬁnal model is fortuitous. Interestingly, it is possible to get a check on that
result by using the index of centralization of wage bargaining in Iversen (1999, Chs 1
14
and 3): Replacing I1t+2·I1t31 in (9) with Iversen’s index (lagged) yields a coe!cient
of -0.38947 with a “t-value” of -3.122 over a sample that ends in 1996.5 Moreover,
Iversen’s index of wage centralization is highly correlated with I1t + 2 · I1t31, as
showed in ﬁgure 2. An approximation to Iversen’s index, based on regression over
the period 1963-1995, is:
dIver t = 0.32
(0.04)
+ 0.18
(0.05)
I1t + 0.15
(0.06)
I3t(10)
R2 = 0.60 DW = 1.53
which suggests that in terms of our own operational deﬁnitions, Iversen’s index can
be expressed as a combination of the level of bargaining and the degree of worker
side coordination.6
In sum there is evidence that the level of bargaining, and possibly also the
level of worker side coordination, has aected Norwegian unemployment. In order
to gauge the numerical signiﬁcance of the level of bargaining eect in (9), assume
that the going rate of unemployment is 10%. According to the model, a change from
decentralized to centralized wage settlements then lowers the rate of unemployment
to 8.8% in the course of two years. However, that illustration is too partial since
both the rate of labour market programmes (prot) and the wage-share (wsht) change
when the rate of unemployment is reduced. Hence, the the impact on unemployment
of moving from centralization to decentralization may be both larger and smaller
than the single equation results suggest.
The model in table 3 provides a wider setting to consider these issues. We
started from an unrestricted 1st order vector autoregression (VAR) in the three
variables {tut, prot and wsht. Even though only I1 was found to play a role in
the tu equation, there may be indirect eects of the other indicators, (via prot and
wsht). Therefore all ﬁve indicators and their lags were included in the VAR. For
the same reason the replacement ratio rpr was also included.
The estimated unemployment equation is virtually unchanged from the single
equation results. For ease of interpretation we have however omitted I1t, the least
signiﬁcant part of the composite dummy I1t + 2 · I1t31in equation (9). The second
equation, explaining the programme rate, is basically a reaction function that pegs
the programme rate to the total rate of unemployment. However, it appears that
a higher (manufacturing sector) wage-share lowers the programme rate, reﬂecting
that the government is making the provision of active labour market programmes
conditional on the maintenance of cost competitiveness of the manufacturing sector.
The third equation explains the wage-share by the lagged rate of unemploy-
ment and the lagged replacement rate. The signiﬁcance of rprt31 is evidence of
5The estimates of the other coe!cients in (9) are practically unaected.
6We note that, using dIver t1 in the place of I1t + 2 · I1t1 gives a coe!cient of -0.325 with a
t-value of -2.245.
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Table 3: Norway: FIML estimation results.
The unemployment equationd{tut = 7.029
(2.678)
 0.381
(0.075)
tut31  5.618
(1.070)
{yt
+ 0.297
(0.071)
({prot + prot) + 1.061
(0.420)
wsht31  0.099
(0.037)
I1t31
jˆ = 0.083
The programme rate equationcprot = 19.81
(6.15)
+ tut31  2.94
(0.97)
wsht31
jˆ = 0.307
The wage-share equationdwsht = 2.311
(0.814)
+ 0.634
(0.130)
wsht31  0.014
(0.008)
tut31
 0.033
(0.012)
I2t + 0.015
(0.010)
(I3t + I3t31)
 0.054
(0.023)
{I5t + 0.120
(0.047)
rprt31  0.114
(0.030)
i1979t
jˆ = 0.028
Diagnostics
2ENC(35) = 36.4221[0.4024]
vFAR(18, 68) = 1.8398[0.0387]
v2(6) = 8.7506[0.1881]
The sample is 1963 to 1998, 36 observations.
an indirect eect of the labour insurance system on unemployment. Finally, there
are four indicator variables in the wage-share equation. First, the incomes policy
indicator (I2) which has a negative coe!cient. Second, the two year average of I3
(worker side coordination) has a positive eect on the wage-share. Third, the term
{I5t captures a short-run eect of a change in what we have called the bargaining
climate. Finally, and outside the list of bargaining indicators, i1979t is an impulse
dummy for 1979, when there was a wage and price freeze.
The statistic 2ENC(35) in the Diagnostics part of the table shows there are
35 (overidentifying) restrictions on the underlying VAR, which are jointly insigniﬁ-
cant. Hence, the econometric model in the table encompasses the VAR, see Hendry
and Mizon (1993). The other test statistics are vector tests of 2nd order residual
autocorrelation, and of residual non-normality. These statistics are explained in
Doornik and Hendry (1996b). We note that the test of autocorrelation is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, so there is room for improvements in terms of ﬁt. However, the
estimated model is su!ciently congruent to serve as an illustration of the numerical
importance of changes in the bargaining indicator variables.
Consider ﬁrst a change (from 0 to 1) in I1, representing a move from de-
centralization to centralization. Assuming initial rates of 10% and 4% for total
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unemployment and labour market programmes, total unemployment is predicted to
be reduced to 6.4%, the programme rate rate to 2.8% and the rate of open unem-
ployment from 6% to 3.6%, all within a time span of 4 years. A policy change to
“active” incomes policy (I2 ) leads to quite dierent predictions: Total unemploy-
ment increases to 10.4% because the lower wsh allows an increase in the programme
rate, to 5%, and consequently the rate of open unemployment is reduced from 6%
to 5.6%. However, in the longer run both unemployment rates are reduced in this
experiment. Finally, consider a change in worker coordination (I3) from “low” to
“high”, which according to the model leads to an increased wage-share. Thus there
is lowering of the programme rate, from 4% to 3.2%, and therefore total unemploy-
ment is reduced (to 9.7%), while the rate of open unemployment is increased, to
6.4%.
4.3 Sweden
The estimated coe!cients of the general model in table 4 shows that the results
for the economic explanatory variables ({yt, wsht31 and prot) come close to the
results for Norway in table 2.7 However, neither the economic variables nor the
institutional indictor variables are of any help in explaining the raise in the rate
of unemployment early in the sample–in 1964-1967 and in 1967-1976. Hence, we
include two dummies, DUM1t and DUM2t for these time periods, as one way of
whitening the residuals.8
Interestingly, the results for the indicator variables are somewhat dierent from
what we obtained for Norway. The current value of the income policy indicator I2t
has a t-probability of 0.09. Moreover, both the employer coordination indicator I4,
and the climate variable I5t also have levels of signiﬁcance better than 0.5 which,
following our liberal strategy for simplifying the GUM, means that we keep the
variables. At ﬁrst sight, the positively signed coe!cient of the level of bargaining
indicator I1t is troublesome. However, note that there is no variation in this indi-
cator between 1964 and 1982, as all wage settlements are classiﬁed as centralized.
Thus, the coincidence of a sharp increase in unemployment and a (temporary) return
to centralized bargaining in 1991 probably gets a high leverage for the coe!cient of
I1t.
Based on table 4, we have obtained the ﬁnal equation for Sweden shown in
equation (11). The included economic variables are the same as for Norway (compare
equation (9)), and the estimated coe!cients are strikingly similar. The equation re-
tains I2 (incomes policy), the lagged value of I4 (employer coordination) and I5
7In the case of Sweden the wage share variable is for the private sector, and yt is a measure
of aggregate demand, see Forslund and Kulm (2000)
8DUM1 is one in the years 1964-1967, zero elsewhere. DUM2t is one in the period 1967-1976,
zero elsewhere.
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Table 4: Sweden: Modelling {tut from 1964 to 1997. (OLS estimation results
for a general model)
Variable Coe!cient Std. Error t-prob
Constant 1.0639 0.61736 0.1041
tut31 -0.18414 0.13925 0.2047
{yt -6.2393 0.99710 0.0000
wsht31 0.95619 1.0075 0.3567
{prot 0.71079 0.094271 0.0000
prot31 0.25640 0.15798 0.1241
I1t 0.20389 0.12596 0.1251
I1t31 -0.0011157 0.13236 0.9934
I2t -0.10358 0.057187 0.0889
I2t31 0.0027546 0.055332 0.9609
I3t -0.021825 0.091881 0.8153
I3t31 0.054207 0.081781 0.5169
I4t -0.13983 0.13396 0.3121
I4t31 -0.17576 0.10951 0.1281
I5 -0.084775 0.080386 0.3073
I5t31 0.0078693 0.067400 0.9085
DUM1t 0.24635 0.10003 0.0255
DUM2t 0.40040 0.15568 0.0205
R2 = 0.948 jˆ = 0.070 DW = 2.6
for 18 variables and 34 observations.
FAR(2, 14) = 2.7892[0.0956],
FARCH(1, 14) = 0.67408[0.4254]
2N (2) = 3.6591[0.1605]
(climate). Taken at face value, this equation therefore indicates a richer response of
unemployment to changes in coordination indicators than was the case of Norway,
with a particular vigorous eect of employer coordination on the rate of unemploy-
ment.
{ btut = 1.342
(0.447)
 0.264
(0.057)
tut31  6.017
(0.833)
{yt + 1.274
(0.694)
wsht31(11)
+ 0.334
(0.036)
({prot + prot) 0.094
(0.035)
I2t  0.183
(0.050)
I4t31
 0.083
(0.044)
I5t + 0.281
(0.075)
DUM1t + 0.476
(0.111)
DUM2t
R2 = 0.931 jˆ = 0.065 DW = 2.3 FENC(8, 16) = 0.64[0.73]
FAR(2, 22) = 0.43[0.65] FARCH(1, 22) = 0.00[0.99]
2N(2) = 3.53[0.17] FX2(15, 8) = 0.33[0.97].
There is considerable stability in estimated coe!cients, as shown in ﬁgure 3,
despite that the shocks to the labour market in Sweden around 1990 were even larger
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Figure 3: Recursive stability of ﬁnal model of the Swedish rate of unemployment in
equation (11).
than in Norway.9
In the same manner as for Norway, we investigated the eects of adding the
replacement rate (and its lag) to equation (11), and with similar results: Both the
current and lagged value obtained negative coe!cient estimates, and the statistic
for the joint null hypothesis of both coe!cients being zero was F( 2, 22) = 1.471
[0.2514].
However, introduction of Iversen’s indicator for Sweden produced interesting
results: It obtains a signiﬁcant “t- value” of 2.4 when added to (11) and the
estimated coe!cient of I4t31 is changed from 0.18 to 0.08, i.e., it is now in line
with the coe!cients of I2t and I5t. Using our set of indicator variables in an attempt
to explain Iversen’s index yields the following regression over the sample 1965-1998:
dIver t = 0.39
(0.02)
+ 0.11
(0.04)
I1t + 0.09
(0.03)
I4t31(12)
R2 = 0.66 DW = 0.52.
Although there is positive residual autocorrelation which makes it di!cult to assess
9In order not to glut the ﬁgure, the panel with the 1-step Chow statistics has been omitted,
but none of the statistics are signiﬁcant over the period 1979-1997.
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Figure 4: Sweden. Upper panel: The best predictor indicator variable I2t+ I4t31+
I5t and the rate of unemployment. Lower panel: Iversen’s index and the rate of
unemployment. Graphs in both panels are scale adjusted.
the statistical signiﬁcance of the two retained regressors, equation (12) helps explain
why the numerical importance of I4t is reduced when Ivert is added to model (11).
Moreover, the fact that equation (12) fails to explain Ivert very well, suggests that
Iversen’s index contains separate information relative to our set of indicator vari-
ables. Figure 4 compares the two indicators with the Swedish rate of unemployment
in two separate panels. The visible correlation in the upper panel reﬂects that the
index by construction is the best predictor of the rate of unemployment among the
possible linear combinations of the indices included in table 4. The interpretation of
Iversen index is hampered by its trend behaviour. However, it is strongly correlated
with the rate of unemployement in the 1990s.
Using both Iversen’s and our own set of variables yields the equation (13) for
the Swedish rate of (total) unemployment.
{ btut = 1.231
(0.310)
 0.343
(0.045)
tut31  4.680
(0.627)
{yt + 0.985
(0.470)
wsht31(13)
+ 0.340
(0.028)
({prot + prot) 0.080
(0.022)
(I2t + I4t31 + I5t)
 0.644
(0.190)
Ivert + 0.227
(0.047)
DUM1t + 0.453
(0.068)
DUM2t
R2 = 0.95 jˆ = 0.051 DW = 2.1
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Table 5: Sweden: FIML estimation results.
The unemployment equationd{tut = 1.45
(0.49412)
 0.327
(0.101)
tut31  4.503
(0.667)
{yt
+ 1.335
(0.992)
wsht31 + 0.330
(0.101)
({prot + prot) 0.087
(0.027)
(I2t + I4t31 + I5t)
 0.698
(0.224)
Ivert + 0.251
(0.063)
DUM1t + 0.427
(0.106)
DUM2t
jˆ = 0.057
The programme rate equationcprot = 0.321
(0.431)
+ 0.832
(0.062)
tut31  3.400
(0.684)
wsht31
jˆ = 0.174
The wage share equationdwsht = 0.587
(0.072)
+ 0.269
(0.104)
wsht31  0.082
(0.008)
tut31
+ 0.048
(0.009)
(I1t + I3t) 0.034
(0.0076)
(I4t + I5t + I5t31)
 0.049
(0.011)
DUM1t  0.107
(0.018)
DUM2t
jˆ = 0.013
Diagnostics
2ENC(35) = 48.34[0.07]
vFAR(18, 54) = 0.95[0.53]
v2(6) = 8.64[0.20]
The sample is 1964 to 1997, 34 observations.
In table 5 the model in (13) is estimated jointly with equations for the programme
rate and the wage-share. In line with the results for Norway, we ﬁnd that some
of the indicator variables are aecting the rate of unemployment indirectly, via the
wage-share equation. One indicator, I4 (union coordination), enters in both the
equation for the rate of total unemployment and in the wage-share equation.
The model in table 5 can be used to illustrate the numerical importance of
changes in the dierent dimensions of Swedish corporatism. The indicators divide
into two groups: A shift in the level of bargaining to centralization (I1 = 1)), or
to strong worker coordination (I3 = 1) is predicted to increase unemployment from
10% to 16.6% (total), and from 6% to 10.2% (open), after fours years.10 The mech-
anism behind this is a rise in real wages.11 On the other hand, a shift in the incomes
policy indicator (I2t) from decentralization to centralization, to high ﬁrm side coor-
dination (I4), or to a favourable bargaining climate (I5), all produce the expected
10In the same manner as for Norway we assume inital rates 10% and 4% for total unemployment
and labour market programmes
11Ivert is unchanged in this eperiment even though I1 is a regressor in equation (12). The reason
is of course that its signiﬁcance may be spurious due to residual autocorrelation.
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fall in unemployment: For incomes policy (I2), the rate of total unemployment is
predicted to fall to 8.3%, and open unemployment to 3.9%. A shift to high ﬁrm side
coordination (I4 = 1) leads to a sharp reduction in total unemployment, to 4.9%12.
However, because the provision of programmes also is reduced, the fall in open un-
employment is more moderate, from 6% to 5%. Finally, for the “climate” indicator
I5, the results suggest a 4.8 percentage point reduction in total unemployment and
a 3 percentage point fall in open unemployment.
5 Conclusion
We have presented econometric models of the Swedish and Norwegian unemploy-
ment rates that have a similar structure, even in terms of the estimated coe!cient
values of individual explanatory variables. This similarity supports the view that
the models capture important factors behind unemployment in the two neighbouring
economies. Moreover, the models are congruent with the data properties and have
coe!cients that are stable over the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, the models represent
a valid framework for testing the individual and joint eects of the institutional
developments that we have measured with a new set of coordination indices.
As discussed in section 3, there are several dimensions of coordination in col-
lective wage bargaining. This suggest that there may be some value added in a set
of indices for each country, i.e., for each facet of coordination, in addition to joint
indices of the type presented in the seminal work of Iversen (1999). Our empirical
results lend some support to that view. First, it appears that some but not all
facets of “high coordination” are favourable to low unemployment. For example,
the Swedish results indicate that periods of highly centralized wage bargaining (I1)
and worker side coordination (I3) have made it di!cult to attain the goal of full em-
ployment, since ﬁrms’ proﬁtability have suered. On the other hand, active income
policy (I2), high ﬁrm side coordination and a favourable climate (I5) between the
bargaining parties, appear to have been good for keeping the rate of unemployment
low. Second, it is not obvious that the dierent facets of wage settlements have
the same impact on unemployment in the two countries, since the eventual eects
will depend on the interactions with other parts of the political economy. For exam-
ple, while highly centralized settlements have increased unemployment via increased
wage-share in Sweden, a high value of the I1 indicator is singled out as one bene-
ﬁcial factor for keeping unemployment low in Norway. Taken at face value, these
results indicates that the label “high centralization” actually means dierent things
in the Swedish and Norwegian political and economic systems. This possibility has
been discussed by e.g., Freeman (1997) and Rødseth and Nymoen (1999), and one
corroborating observation is that Sweden seems to have abandoned centralization
12Again, Ivert is kept unchanged.
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permanently in 1993, while in Norway it remains very much a part on the picture,
see table 1 above.
There is a possibility that these and other substantive conclusions lack robust-
ness because the econometric models on which they are based may be inﬂuenced
by e.g., fortuitous correlation and “path dependency” in going from the general to
the ﬁnal model, cf. section 4.1. Typically, new data when they become available,
will corroborate some of our conclusions, while others may indeed turn out to re-
ﬂect “data mining”. For the time being, we venture that the estimated eects of
changes in wage coordination are statistically more reliable for Sweden than for Nor-
way. We also note that Iversen’s (1999) indices of wage bargaining centralization,
when included into our econometric equations for Sweden and Norway , support the
conclusions based on our new set of indices. Another issue that we want to return
to in future research, concerns the possible endogeneity of the coordination indices
themselves, possibly within a framework that pools the data set of the two countries,
thus taking advantage of the similarities in structure that this paper has disclosed.
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